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WHEN THE SHEPHERD PREYS ON THE FLOCK:




E ARLY American society scrutinized the sexual and marital prac-
tices of its citizens. The common law considered a wife to be the
servant of her husband and provided the husband with a cause of ac-
tion against anyone who enticed his wife away from him.' Eventually,
the courts found that a wife also had a proprietary interest in her hus-
band's services and extended this cause of action to women who had
their husbands lured away from them by others. 2 This cause of action,
alienation of affection, was one of several "amatory actions" that in-
cluded breach of promise to marry,3 criminal conversation, 4 and se-
duction.' Since the 1930s, however, a majority of the states have
abolished or severely curtailed amatory causes of action, either by
statute or by judicial edict.6
The trend toward elimination of amatory actions is directly linked
to changes in society, including increasing societal interest in personal
choice, decriminalization of sexual activities in many states, and grow-
ing skepticism about the law's role in protecting feelings and in en-
1. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 124, at 916 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
3. This cause of action provided recovery for the loss of financial or social benefits that
the plaintiff would have otherwise obtained upon marriage. It also allowed recovery for damage
to the plaintiff's health, reputation, social status, and future prospects of marriage. Duttenhof-
fer v. Duttenhoffer, 474 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
4. "A recovery for criminal conversation requires proof that there was a valid marriage
and that the defendant had adulterous relations with the plaintiff's spouse." 1 H. CILARK, THE
LAW OF DoisTic RELATIONS n TEI UNITED STATES § 12.3, at 662 (2d ed. 1987).
5. The tort of seduction provided recovery for damage to character and reputation, for
mental anguish, and for pecuniary losses suffered by a female who was lured into having sex out
of wedlock. See Breon v. Hinkle, 14 Or. 494, 13 P. 289 (1887).
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (1980); Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977). See also O'Neil v.
Shuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d 452 (1980); Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790,
(Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
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forcing personal morality. 7 Today, an adult's decision-to enter into a
sexual relationship with another consenting adult is ordinarily consid-
ered to be a private issue outside the scope of legal concern.8 This
laissez-faire attitude toward most sexual relationships between adults,
however, does not mean that the government is powerless to intervene
in situations where government intervention is considered warranted. 9
This Comment analyzes one of the situations in which the govern-
ment should intervene, namely, . the sexual exploitation of
parishioners'0 by members of the clergy." It argues that sexual
relations 2 between clergy 3 and parishioners are inherently problem-
atic and that the clergy has the responsibility to avoid these relations.
The Comment posits that sexual contact between clergy and parish-
ioners constitutes sexual exploitation on the part of the clergy. Noting
that clergy sexual exploitation of parishioners is a widespread occur-
rence and is significantly harmful to its victims, this Comment ana-
lyzes different solutions and remedies that are available to ameliorate
the problem. It concludes that legislative action is necessary and
would reap significant benefits, and it proposes a course of action.
II. THE ISSUE OF CONSENT
When two persons decide to enter into a sexual relationship, both par-
7. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 930.
8. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (interpreting the right to privacy as grant-
ing individuals, married or single, the right to make fundamentally private decisions free from
unwarranted government intervention); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (expound-
ing on the freedom of association component of the right to privacy).
9. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding laws prohibiting homosexual
sodomy); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) ("Although the constitutional right to privacy normally shields sexual relations
from judicial scrutiny, it does not do so where the right to privacy is used as a shield from
liability at the expense of the other party."); State v. Ketter, 364 N.W.2d 459, 462-63 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (upholding laws prohibiting prostitution).
10. The term "parishioners" is used to denote the lay persons who form the congregations
or followings of religious organizations. In this Comment the term is used interchangeably with
the term "followers."
11. The term "clergy" is used to denote religious leaders regardless of the religion or sect to
which they belong. Priest, pastor, minister, rabbi, and similar terms may be used interchangeably.
12. This includes not only sexual intercourse, but other forms of sexual behavior-fondling,
kissing, and erotic talk-as well.
13. This Comment uses masculine terms, e.g., clergyman and he, when referring to clergy, and
feminine terms when referring to a parishioner victim, because the vast majority of sexual exploita-
tion cases involve male clergy and female parishioners. See Cooper-White, Soul Stealing: Power
Relations in Pastoral Sexual Abuse, THE CmusTN CaEruiY 196 (1991). Sexual exploitation also
occurs between pastors and parishioners of the same sex, id., and the recommendations given in this
Comment should be applied with full force to those cases as well.
CLERG Y SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
ties assume the risks inherent in such a relationship. Both parties usually
understand that the emotional investment they are making may not pay
off and that they may eventually suffer the hurt associated with a failed
relationship. When the parties are in relatively equal positions, these
risks are voluntarily assumed and the consequences that may result are
part and parcel of the social interactions that make up such a large and
important part of life. Our society has determined that competent adults
should be free to choose their sexual partners, so long as both parties
consent to the relationship.14
A. The Power Imbalance
Sexual relationships between clergy and parishioners do not fall
within the category of voluntary relationships between consenting
adults. As several commentators on the subject have noted, authentic
consent on the part of the parishioner in this type of relationship does
not exist. '5
Consent is illusory for two reasons. First, there is a disproportionate
distribution of power in the clergy-parishioner relationship. The widely-
used analogy characterizing the clergyman as a shepherd and the parish-
ioners as his flock attests to the asymmetry of power between the two
parties. The clergyman is the congregation's leader, while the parish-
ioner is the follower who places her respect and trust in the clergyman.
The most insidious aspect of the clergyman's power is the role he
plays as a link between the parishioners and God. The clergyman is per-
ceived as carrying "ultimate spiritual authority, particularly in the eyes
of a trusting parishioner who looks to him for spiritual guidance and
support.' 16 A parishioner can seldom give true consent to sexual rela-
tions with a clergyman when she believes that his power and authority
come from God.
The clergyman's role as emotional and spiritual counselor also height-
ens the power imbalance, making the parishioner more vulnerable and
dependent, and further inhibiting any ability to freely consent to sexual
relations. During counseling, a woman often shares the most intimate
details of her life with her pastor.' 7 In his role as a counselor, 8 a clergy-
man often sees women at their most vulnerable.
14. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
15. See M. FORTUNE, Is NoTNO SACRED? WHEN SEX INVADES THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHP
(1989); Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197; Morey, Blaming Women for the Sexually Abusive
Male Pastor, THm CmuslAN CENTURY 866 (1988); Pellauer, Sex, Power, and the Family of God:
Clergy and Sexual Abuse in Counseling, CmusTiANrTr AND CiRSiS 47 (1987).
16. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197.
17. See Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 198.
18. From 1957 to 1976, the number of Americans who sought help from a religious or secular
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Further, it is a medically accepted fact that a person undergoing
counseling "develop[s] extreme emotional dependence on the thera-
pist." 9 "[A] sexual liaison in such a situation has all the earmarks of
exploitation. "20
B. The Transference Phenomenon
The second condition that vitiates true consent in cases of clergy-
parishioner sexual relations is the existence of a psychological phe-
nomenon known as "transference." Transference is a term employed
by psychologists and psychiatrists to denote a patient's emotional re-
sponse to a therapist and "is generally applied to the projection of
feelings, thoughts and wishes onto an analyst, who has come to repre-
sent some person from the patient's past." ' 2' These feelings can be
transferred consciously or unconsciously and are usually feelings that
patients have toward their parents. 22
The occurrence of the transference phenomenon in therapeutic sit-
uations was one of the many theories of Sigmund Freud. 23 Although
some of Freud's theories and conclusions have been criticized or aban-
18. From 1957 to 1976, the number of Americans who sought help from a religious or secular
counselor increased from one out of every seven Americans to one out of every four. H. CLINEuELL,
BASIC TYPES OF PASIoRAL CARE AND CouNsE.oG 47 (1984). Most of these people turned to the
clergy with their problems. King & Woodward, When a Pastor Turns Seducer, NEwswEEK, Aug. 28,
1989, at 48.
19. See Masters & Johnson, Principles of the New Sex Therapy, 133 AM. J. PSYCmATRY
548, 553 (1976).
20. Siassi & Thomas, Physicians and the New Sexual Freedom, 130 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY
1256, 1257 (1973).
21. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th ed. 1982).
22. D. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PsYCImATRIsTs 6 (1973). A clear and helpful expla-
nation of how transference operates is found in Simmons v. United States:
What the notion of transference assumes is that as therapy develops, and if therapy is
working, the client comes to either consciously or unconsciously, or both, regard the
therapist as a child might regard a parent. This is important because in order for a
therapist to have positive powerful impact in helping the client to change and heal, the
therapist has to have the same kind of authority power in a positive way with the
client that the parents once had, or the parental figures once had in a negative way
with the client while the client was growing up. And, so what happens when therapy is
working . . . is that this transference relationship grows so that the client comes to
experience the therapist as a powerful, benevolent parent figure. And, what that
means is that you've got a symbolic, sometimes conscious sometimes not, parent-child
relationship existing in the therapy setting, even though you have two adults there.
805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting the trial court testimony of clinical psychologist Dr.
Laura Brown).
23. S. FREUD, ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON TRANSFERENCE 1 (A. Esman ed. 1990). Freud's theories
included, among others, "the power of the dynamic unconscious; the meaningfulness of the
dream; the phenomena of infantile sexuality." Id.
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doned by members of the psychoanalytic community,24 the concept of
transference has proven to be a "unifying theme. '25
The transference phenomenon has serious implications for the pro-
priety of sexual relations between a therapist and a patient. Medical
authorities are nearly unanimous in considering sexual contact be-
tween therapist and patient to be a mishandling of the transference
phenomenon.26 Sexual relations are unacceptable because "the trans-
ference represents a true reconstruction of the past, a vivid reliving of
earlier desires and fears that distort the patient's capacity to perceive
the 'true nature' of the present reality.' '27 Transference robs patients
of their ability to exercise independent judgment. 2 Accordingly, true
consent to sexual relations on the part of the patient becomes a fic-
tion. One court stated:
[A] sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be
viewed separately from the therapeutic relationship that has
developed between them. The transference phenomenon makes it
impossible that the patient will have the same emotional response to
sexual contact with the therapist that he or she would have to sexual
contact with other persons.29
The majority of courts that have considered the problem have rec-
ognized the implications of transference for the viability of consent.
The courts have been almost unanimous in holding that sexual rela-
tions between a therapist and a patient constitute malpractice and per-




26. See Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient,
133 AM. J. PsYcmATrY 1138, 1139 (1976) (Experts agree that "there are absolutely no circum-
stances which would permit a psychiatrist to engage in sex with his patient. All such instances
constitute misuse of the transference.").
27. Cooper, Changes in Psychoanalytic Ideas: Transference Interpretation, 35 J. Am. PsY-
CHoANALYXiC A. 80, 81 (1987).
28. J. SMITH, MEDICAL MAI.PRACTIcE-PsYCIIATKC CARE 309 (1986).
29. L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 122 Wis. 2d 455, 458, 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (1984)
(emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (health service coun-
selor); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984) (physician's assistant who had
taken counseling and psychology courses); Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243
Cal. Rptr. 807 (1988) (psychiatrist); Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985)
(social worker); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986) (social worker); Cotton v. Kambly,
101 Mich. App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980) (psychiatrist); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 381
N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (psychiatrist); Mazza v. Huffaker, 61 N.C. App. 170, 300
S.E.2d 833 (1983) (psychiatrist); Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (psy-
chologist).
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Although the transference phenomenon is usually discussed in the
context of psychiatrist- or psychologist-patient relationships, the same
dynamics are in effect when the clergy assumes the role of religious
counselor." In fact, pastoral counseling has been called "the oldest
form of psychotherapy. " 3 2 The pioneers of modern psychology real-
ized the basic similarity between secular therapy and religious counsel-
ing:
Freud directly acknowledged the essential similarity between
psychoanalytic therapy and religious counseling by describing
psychoanalysis as "pastoral work in the best sense of the words." He
thus recognized in psychoanalysis what is true in all psychotherapy
and counseling; namely that it is similar, and indeed a rival, to the
long Christian tradition of confession and counseling.
Jung also was quite aware of the religious nature of psychotherapy
.[as illustrated] when he writes: "Patients force a psychotherapist
into a role of priest, and expect that he shall free them from distress.
This is why we psychotherapists must occupy ourselves with
problems which strictly speaking belong to the theologian." 33
The ramifications of transference on the issue of parishioner con-
sent cannot be ignored. During the last decade, the clergy has assumed
a more prominent role in emotional and spiritual counseling.3 In fact,
many of the clergy are spending from twenty-five to sixty percent of
their time in face-to-face consultation." Some churches even advertise
positions for clergy who do nothing but counseling. 36 As more of the
clergy get into the counseling business with its inherent problems asso-
ciated with transference, it is not surprising that some commentators
have argued that the guidelines and ethics of accountability that apply
to secular therapists and proscribe any sexual contact with patients
should also apply to the clergy. 37
III. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE BEAST
Very little has been written on the issue of clergy sexual exploitation
of parishioners. 3 A general perception that "these things simply do
31. See Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197.
32. C. STEIN, PRACTICAL PASTORAL COUNSELING at vii (1970).
33. Vitz, Psychology and Religion, BAKER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 932, 933-34 (D.
Benner ed. 1985) (citations omitted).
34. Breecher, Ministerial Malpractice: Is It a Reasonable Fear?, TsAL, July, 1980, at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Morey, supra note 15, at 47.
38. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 196.
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not happen in the church" 3 9 explains the lack of comment. This per-
ception is perpetuated by hesitancy on the part of the victims of pas-
toral sexual exploitation to come forward and tell their stories. 40
A. The Code of Secrecy
Many parishioners victimized by their pastor don't speak out
against their abuser because they fear that doing so would wreak cata-
strophic harm on their reputation. 41 Many also fear that they will be-
come ostracized by their community and friends, 42 suffering "what
may amount to a devastating social and spiritual exile." '43 Many are
cajoled or threatened into secrecy by the exploiting clergymen," while
others blame themselves. 45
Even in the infrequent situation where clergy sexual abuse is actu-
ally reported and believed, it is likely to be brushed off as an extreme
and isolated incident."
B. The High Incidence of Exploitation
Unfortunately, incidents of clergy sexual misconduct are far more
prevalent than is commonly believed. 47 It is estimated that more than
ten percent of all clergymen are engaged in sexual or romantic rela-
tionships with their parishioners or counselees." This number exceeds
the figure commonly ascribed to male psychotherapists. 49 According
to the figures gathered by one church, the percentage of clergymen
engaged in sexual misconduct may even be as high as twenty-three
percent."
39. M. FORTUNE, supra note 15, at xvii.
40. King & Woodard, supra note 18, at 48. "The shame of the victims, the embarrassment
of the congregation and the pride of church hierarchs all conspire to make sexual abuse by clergy
second only to incest as a taboo subject." Id.
41. Morey, supra note 15, at 866.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 50.
45. King & Woodard, supra note 18, at 49.
46. M. FoRTUNE, supra note 15, at xvii.
47. Id.
48. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 196.
49. Id.
50. Miami Herald, June 12, 1991, at 20A, col. 2. These figures came from the Presbyterian
Church, which found evidence suggesting that between 10% and 23% of clergy nationwide have
had sexual contact with parishioners, clients, or employees while performing their religious du-
ties. Id.
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C. The Opportunities for Exploitation
Such a high frequency of exploitation can only be comprehended in
light of the numerous opportunities for sexual exploitation that exist
in religious organizations. First, the clergy is surrounded by parishion-
ers who, as has already been discussed,5' are easy prey for the unscru-
pulous.
Second, churches exhibit systemic factors that are conducive to sex-
ual exploitation, including: "homogenized values within an organiza-
tion; overcommitment by staff; high stress/low support; and ... 'no
talk' rules about sexuality." 5 2
Third, a clergyman's frequent position as counselor also offers op-
portunities for sexual abuse. 53 The "clear boundaries" that delineate
what the proper limits are for interactions between the secular thera-
pist and client do not exist in the religious counseling arena.54
Fourth, the clergy often has "almost total access to the homes and
lives of their parishioners. Many clergymen are loath to set any limits
on where and how they will meet people." 55 Often there is significant
social interaction between clergy and parishioners. 56
Fifth, the clergy seldom receives supervision. 7 Without supervision,
the opportunity for sexual exploitation is multiplied. Once a pastor
develops a sexual attraction and zeroes in on a particularly vulnerable
parishioner, there is no one to intervene and take preventative action.
Sometimes a clergyman realizes how easy it is to take advantage of
these opportunities and develops a pattern of victimization. For exam-
ple, one minister slept with more than thirty women in his congrega-
tion." The harm done to the victims was tremendous: of these thirty
women, one attempted suicide and several others divorced as a result
of the sexual exploitation.59
51. See supra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
52. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 48.
53. Morey, supra note 15, at 866.
54. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 48.
55. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 49 (quoting James Sparks, a Presbyterian minister
and University of Wisconsin professor).
56. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 48.
57. Id. at 49.
58. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 49. Another example of repeated exploitation is
the case of Dennis Hawk, a minister in the Lutheran Church for 15 years. Hawk was considered
to be successful and hardworking. He had a loving wife and two children. Hawk also had affairs
with 16 members of his congregation. Typically targeting women who were emotionally needy,
Hawk did not make any sexual advances unless he felt certain that he would not be rebuffed.
Hawk eventually sought help through group therapy because he felt ashamed of his actions. Id.
Hawk understood the dynamics of what was occurring. He admitted that he was the perpetrator:
"It was authority rape on my part." Id.
59. Id.
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D. The Victims'Devastation
Although most sexual exploitation cases do not involve such a large
number of victims, each victim's harm suffered is extensive. Gener-
ally, the psychological and emotional damage suffered by victims of
clergy exploitation is severe and long-term. A consultant in a program
for survivors of clergy exploitation wrote of "the lasting devastations
that these women have experienced.' ' 6 Another expert wrote of the
similarity between clergy sexual abuse and incestuous abuse.6' If the
clergyman is acting as a counselor, the victim often sees him as a fa-
ther figure and subconsciously transfers the love she has for her father
onto the clergyman. 62 When a clergyman takes advantage of this situa-
tion and sexually exploits the counselee, she suffers the same kind of
"shame, guilt and anxiety experienced by incest victims. '"63
Common manifestations of the harm suffered by clients exploited
by their secular counselors include diminished self esteem, increased
feelings of personal ambivalence, increased sexual difficulties, anger
at being exploited, a feeling of being used as a sex object, and an
inability to trust other therapists. 64 The more severe cases of anxiety
and depression sometimes lead to hospitalization and suicide at-
tempts.65
The harms suffered by parishioners exploited by religious counsel-
ors are likely to be even more severe than those suffered by clients
60. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 196.
61. Morey, supra note 15, at 866. Morey stated that:
Sexual abuse by pastors exhibits the same dynamic as incestuous abuse, which takes
place within the context of an intimate relationship (family, church, counseling) be-
tween an authoritative and powerful person (a relative or minister) and a person who
is vulnerable to and trusting of that power (a child or counselee). Victims often feel
responsible for the abuser's activity and so are bound in secrecy by a double burden of
guilt and shame. Even if the victim does speak up, she or he may not be believed.
Id.
62. This is due to the transference phenomenon. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying
text.
63. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting the district
court opinion). The extent of the devastation suffered by incest victims is similar to the long-
term harms that may be suffered by clergy exploitation victims. Incest victims exhibit a markedly
increased tendency toward substance abuse and addiction, obesity, and sexual dysfunction.
Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule
and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 191, 193-94 (1985). Adults molested as chil-
dren also have severely impaired relationship skills and are likely to abuse their children. Id. at
194. As many as 80% of women molested as children have been institutionalized or have en-
gaged in prostitution and nearly 40% of adult incest victims have attempted suicide. Id. at 193.
64. Zelen, Sexualization of Therapeutic Relationships: The Dual Vulnerability of Patient
and Therapist, 22 PSYCHOTHERAPY 178, 181-82 (1985).
65. Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1367 (citing the district court).
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similarly victimized by secular therapists. The damage done to parish-
ioners by sexually exploitive clergymen "may be magnified-to cos-
mic proportions," 66 by the "God factor." The violation of trust may
spur a spiritual crisis in which the victim leaves the church, suffering
the "loss of pastor, faith and the community of faith. ' 67 The victims
are often left in a state of "spiritual shock" 68 in which they blame
God for violating their sacred trust.69
The harms suffered by the victims of clergy sexual exploitation are
neither exclusively psychological nor exclusively spiritual in nature.
The severe psychological damage experienced by many of the victims
requires prolonged and expensive treatment. 70 Yet female parishioners
who expose the exploitation are usually blamed for the incidents and
labeled seductresses. 71 Their reputations are shredded. 72 The fallout
from the incidents exact a heavy toll on victims' families. Women may
lose their jobs and sometimes their entire lives in the community. 73
These are not the usual results of a romantic relationship between two
"consenting adults." These unique harms highlight the need for swift
and effective action on the part of the government.
IV. STATUS Quo SOLUTIONS
An analysis of current remedies indicates that the status quo is not
effectively combating clergy sexual exploitation. Neither church self-
regulation nor available judicial remedies are particularly effective.
A. Church Self-Regulation
Historically, churches have been lax in policing their clergy for sex-
ual misconduct. Aside from a general lack of supervision7 4 and a sex-
ual ethic that stresses secrecy and that treats sex as a taboo subject, 75
church leaders have been unwilling to listen to the stories told by the
victims of clergy sexual exploitation. 76
66. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 48.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 49.
70. Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7
H~Av. WOMEN's L.J. 189, 212 (1984).
71. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197.
72. Morey, supra note 15, at 866.
73. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197-98.
74. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 48.
75. Id. at 49.
76. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 48. According to United Methodist Bishop Calvin
McConnell: "What women have been telling us for a number of years has been true, but we
tended to not want to believe them." Id.
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The traditional response to these situations has been to blame the
victims for the sexual transgressions of the clergy.77 This view was il-
lustrated by one commentator who described clergymen as "sitting
duck[s] for the romantically starved.' ' 8 When a woman comes for-
ward and exposes the exploitative clergyman, the congregation is
likely to rally around him. Traditional respect for the clergyman's po-
sition, and the congregation's reluctance to believe that it could have
been mistaken in accepting and trusting its pastor, often lead the con-
gregation to deny the evidence and to blame the victim instead of de-
manding accountability and justice. 79
Part of the problem is that there are few explicit pronouncements of
professional ethics for clergy. One Minnesota-based survey of thirty-
three denominations found that only ten of the thirty-three had a code
of ethics that mentioned sexual exploitation; only six had established
grievance procedures for victims.80
Some churches recently have started to change, recognizing that the
problem "has reached critical proportions.""' In Minnesota, for ex-
ample, churches have responded to the revelations of the state task
force by establishing a statewide interfaith committee to deal with this
problem.82 In June 1991, the Presbyterian Church repealed its three-
year statute of limitations for reporting clergy sexual misconduct.83 It
also adopted a policy of advising local church organizations to estab-
lish procedures to quickly investigate sexual misconduct complaints
and to notify secular authorities if necessary.84 Similarly, the United
Church of Christ has developed national policies on sexual harass-
ment issues.85
These efforts, though laudable, are insufficient. Even though some
religious denominations are starting to treat the problem more seri-
ously, the overall institutional response to the sexual misconduct of
the clergy is woefully inadequate. Typically, when sexually exploita-
tive clergymen are uncovered, they get "a slap on the wrist, a lot of
sympathy and [are] referred to a counselor.' '86 Frequently the minis-
77. Morey, supra note 15, at 866.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Pellauer, supra note 15, at 50. The task force was composed of 100 Minnesota profes-
sionals who were assigned to study the problem of sexual exploitation by therapists and counsel-
ors and to make legal recommendations. Id. at 47.
81. Miami Herald, supra note 50, at 20A, col. 2.
82. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 48.
83. Miami Herald, supra note 50, at 20A, col. 1.
84. Id.
85. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 48.
86. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197.
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ters are simply transferred to another assignment, free to continue to
use exploitative tactics on the unsuspecting members of the new con-
gregations 87
Nor is it likely that the victims of clergy sexual exploitation will turn
to the church for help. Quite often, victims of clergy sexual abuse feel
betrayed not only by the exploitative clergyman, but also by the entire
church-and even by God.88 With their trust in the church completely
undermined, victims are unlikely to turn to the church for solace and
help-especially if they believe the congregation will side with the
priest, as is often the case.
Even if victims decide to turn to the church, they can usually expect
little more than sympathy.8 9 For those who have been so grievously
harmed, sympathy is small consolation. The victims of clergy sexual
abuse need somewhere other than the church to turn to for help.
B. Clergy Malpractice
It has already been established that when psychiatrists, psychother-
apists, or other secular counselors take advantage of the vulnerability
of patients and exploit clients for their own sexual gratification, the
courts will hold the counselors guilty of malpractice and will demand
civil liability for the damages inflicted on the patient.9 Considering
the basic similarities between therapist and clergy sexual exploita-
tion,91 it would seem at first glance that the victims of clergy sexual
exploitation might have an avenue for redress of their grievances in
the form of a cause of action for clergy malpractice.
The term malpractice refers to the failure of a professional to exer-
cise that degree of skill and learning normally applied by members of
that profession in similar circumstances.9 2 One major problem with
clergy malpractice actions is that the skill and learning of religious
leaders varies from religion to religion. 93 This makes it seemingly im-
possible for the courts to develop a general objective standard to eval-
uate the conduct of clergy from the myriad of religions in the United
States.9
87. Morey, supra note 15, at 869.
88. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
89. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 198.
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299(A) (1965).
93. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 289, 763 P.2d 948,
960 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989).
94. Id.
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Without a generalized objective standard to apply, courts would
"inevitably [become involved in making] a judgment of the compe-
tence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function in order
to determine whether the cleric breached the duty" 95 imposed by the
religion's standards. However, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the first amendment bars the judiciary from con-
sidering whether certain religious conduct conforms to the standards
of a particular religious group. 96
In United States v. Lee, the Supreme Court refused to make a de-
termination as to which party had the correct interpretation of the
Amish faith.Y Similarly, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the
United States v. Milivojevich, the Supreme Court held that it was im-
permissible for the courts to inquire into the propriety of the removal
of a bishop from his post and the reorganization of the church dio-
cese."8 In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Security Division, the
Court reiterated its abhorrence toward judicial probing into the
proper interpretation of religious beliefs, making it clear that this sort
of inquiry "is not within the judicial function and judicial compe-
tence."99 The Court stated unambiguously that "[ciourts are not arbi-
ters of scriptural interpretation." '0 According to the Court, "the first
amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role." 10'
This proscription prevents the viability of any clergy malpractice ac-
tion based on a denomination-specific standard. However, some com-
mentators have argued that when a member of the clergy holds
himself out as a skilled and competent counselor, that person should
be required to perform with the same degree of skill and learning nor-
mally applied by secular counselors. 102 This secular-based standard
calls for the application of neutral principles and does not involve the
courts in making unconstitutional inquiries into the standards of a
particular religious group and a clergyman's compliance with those
standards.
95. Id.
96. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1981); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
97. 455 U.S. at 257.
98. 426 U.S. at 696.
99. 450 U.S. at 716.
100. Id.
101. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
102. See, e.g., Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN
Frai. V.L. Rav. 47, 57 (1981); Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a
Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDiNE L. REv. 137, 149 (1986).
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Even if the courts were to recognize clergy-as-counselor malprac-
tice, this cause of action would be an inadequate response to the
clergy sexual exploitation problem. First, this cause of action would
only be available when the clergyman assumes the role of counselor
and holds himself out as possessing a high degree of competence and
expertise. The power imbalance between priest and parishioner, 0 3 and
the risk that the parishioner will be harmed as a result of sexual con-
tact,' °0 exist even if the priest does not assume the role of counselor.
Second, imposing a secular-based standard of care would prove
quite harmful to the religious counseling enterprise. "A rule that
would subject the religious minister to the standard of practice appli-
cable to licensed psychologists or marriage counselors in the commu-
nity would endanger the very distinctions which make religious
counseling desirable."' 0 5 If a standard of care were imposed on reli-
gious counselors, those who would continue to practice could be
forced to "insist upon contractual relationships ... and request re-
leases whenever third parties are to be consulted or treated."'10 Prac-
tices such as these are likely to significantly lessen the value of
religious counseling by reducing the intimacy between the parties.
"[P]eople who have been through painful emotional experiences ...
need a caring, involved person who will accept them as they are and
will work with them."' 7 What they don't need is a seemingly non-
trusting person demanding that they sign a contract or a release form.
As a result of these inherent problems, no court in the land has
recognized this theory of malpractice. 08 Consequently, this potential
remedy is not now available to the victims of clergy sexual exploita-
tion.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Another legal remedy that could potentially be used by the victims
of clergy sexual exploitation is a civil cause of action for breach of
103. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 58-60, 70-73 and accompanying text.
105. Destafano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
106. Comment, Made Out of the Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy
Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L. R-v. 507, 515 (1983).
107. Mahood, Helping Patients Cope With Grief, 3 OSToMY Mor. 14, 15 (1980).
108. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam) (Maddox, J.,
concurring specially); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d
948 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Destafano, 763 P.2d at 275; Baumgartner v. First
Church of Christ, 141 Il. App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915;
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207,
527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). One state
supreme court, while not actually recognizing clergy malpractice, did hold that such a cause of
action might be conceivable. See Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984).
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fiduciary duty. The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the two
parties involved do not deal on equal terms. 1°9 One party has placed
trust and confidence in the other, who has accepted that trust and
confidence and is therefore in a superior position and capable of ex-
erting unique influence over the dependent party."0 The courts have
recognized that the fiduciary "is duty bound to act with the utmost
good faith for the benefit of the other party."'' A fiduciary's obliga-
tions include, among others, a duty of loyalty, 12 a duty to exercise
reasonable care,"' and a duty to deal impartially with beneficiaries." 4
A person standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is subject
to civil liability for any damages suffered by the other resulting from
the breach of any duty arising from the relationship. "'
A fiduciary relationship is a recognized legal relationship such as
guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, attorney and client, 16 or
doctor and patient." 7 In general, members of the professions are said
to be in fiduciary relationships with their clients." 8 The term "profes-
sional" has historically been used to denote those who accept the
status, honor, and other benefits of their position and who-in re-
turn-agree to place the interests and well being of those whom they
serve foremost. 19
Clergymen and parishioners are clearly in fiduciary relationships.
The parishioners place their trust and confidence in the clergymen,
who accept that trust and confidence and are therefore in a position to
exercise unique influence over them. 20 As members of the clerical pro-
fession, clergymen are highly respected and achieve a high degree of
status and influence.121 The courts have recognized the fiduciary na-
ture of the clergy-parishioner relationship.' 22 In doing so, the courts
109. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 382-83, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431-32
(1983).
110. Id.
111. Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 483 (1937).
112. RESTATEM[NT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
113. Id. § 174.
114. Id. § 183.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
116. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. Rav. 795 (1983).
117. Hoopes v. Hammargren, 102 Nev. 425, 725 P.2d 238 (1986).
118. K. POPE & J. BouiiouTsos, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS AND PATIENTS 24
(1986).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Morey, supra note 15, at 869.
122. See Adams v. Moore, 96 N.C. App. 359, 385 S.E.2d 799 (1989) (preacher owed fiduci-
ary duty to parishioner and violated that duty by using his position and influence to obtain the
deed to parishioner's home, then selling it for a quick profit), review denied, 389 S.E.2d 83
(N.C. 1990); see also Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51 (1949) (priest stood in a confiden-
tial relation with parishioner and had duty to act with the utmost good faith).
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have realized that the clergy must accept certain obligations in ex-
change for the respect, status, and influence they are granted.
Victims of clergy sexual exploitation may be able to take advantage
of this realization by the courts and file civil actions against the of-
fending clergyman for breach of fiduciary duty. Two recent decisions
indicate that the courts might be amenable to such a strategy. 23
In Erickson v. Christenson, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that
a pastor who takes advantage of his position and engages in sexual
relations with a minor can be sued for breach of fiduciary duty.'2 The
facts in Erickson differ significantly from the typical clergy sexual ex-
ploitation scenario that is the subject of this Comment. Erickson did
not involve sexual relations between consenting adults. In Erickson,
the pastor began having sexual relations with the plaintiff when she
was only thirteen. 25 These relations continued until the victim reached
adulthood.126 Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the court did not
seem to base its decision on the plaintiff's minority status. Though the
court may have considered the plaintiff's age in deciding that the sex-
ual relations between her and the pastor were not consensual, her age
was not the dispositive issue.
In Destafano v. Grabrian, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that a
priest who engages in sex with an adult parishioner may be held liable
for breach of fiduciary duty. 27 The holding in Destafano, however, is
quite narrow and may be of little help to most of the victims of clergy
sexual exploitation. In Destafano, a couple was experiencing marital
problems and turned to their parish priest for counseling. 2' The priest
represented himself as a competent professional skilled in helping peo-
ple with marital difficulties. 29 He took advantage of the wife's emo-
tional vulnerability and became engaged in a sexual relationship with
her that led to the collapse of her marriage. 30
The court's holding was based on the priest's role as a marriage
counselor, not his role as a priest. The court wrote:
We have no difficulty in finding that Grabrian, as a marriage
counselor to Robert and Edna, owed a fiduciary duty to Edna. His
123. See Destafano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.
App. 104, 781 P.2d 383 (1989).
124. 781 P.2d at 385.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 763 P.2d 275.
128. Id. at 278.
129. Id. at 279.
130. Id.
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duty to Edna was "created by his own undertaking" to counsel her.
Grabrian had a duty, given the nature of the counseling relationship,
to engage in conduct designed to improve the Destefanos' marital
relationship. As a fiduciary, he was obligated not to engage in
conduct which might harm the Destefanos' relationship. If the
allegations are true, it is clear to us that Grabrian breached his duty
and obligation when he had sexual intercourse with Edna.'
The court in Destafano could have said that clergymen have a fidu-
ciary duty to refrain from sexual contact with their parishioners, but it
did not do so. In its opinion, the court mentioned two factors that
probably influenced its decision.
First, the court noted that the State Legislature had expressly ex-
empted the clergy from legislation that proscribed sexual intimacies
between mental health professionals, marriage and family therapists,
and their clients or patients. 132 In deference to the State Legislature,
the court was unlikely to contravene the legislative intent by ruling
that clergymen have a fiduciary duty to refrain from sexual relations
with parishioners.
Second, the court noted that its decision would have been signifi-
cantly more difficult and complicated if the priest had asserted that
his conduct had been dictated by his sincerely held religious beliefs or
that his conduct was consistent with the practice of his religion. 133 This
concern illustrates the caution that courts display whenever they are
called upon to venture into the religious realm. 34 This caution is an-
other factor that makes it less likely that courts will recognize a fiduci-
ary duty of the clergy to refrain from sexual contact with
parishioners. This avenue, though not completely shut off to clergy
sexual exploitation victims, unfortunately holds little promise.
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The intractable nature of the clergy sexual exploitation problem, the
devastation suffered by its victims, and the inadequacy of church and
131. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
132. CoLo. R v. STAT. § 12-43-111(1)(1) (1985), states that:
The [Colorado state board of psychologist examiners] has the power to deny, revoke,
suspend, or refuse to renew any license, or to place on probation a licensee, upon
proof that such person ... (1) [hlas maintained relationships that are likely to impair
his professional judgment or increase the risk of client exploitation, such as . . . hav-
ing sexual intimacies with clients.
The clergy is generally exempted from these requirements in 1988 CoLo. Sas. LAws § 12-43-
215(1). The statute states that persons engaged in the practice of religious ministry are not re-
quired to comply with the provisions of the statute unless they hold themselves out to the public
to be either a psychologist, licensed marriage counselor, family therapist, or licensed profes-
sional counselor.
133. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988).
134. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
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judicial responses all point to the need for swift action on the part of
state legislatures. A handful of states, including Minnesota and Wis-
consin, have enacted criminal'35 and civi' 36 penalties for the perpetra-
tors. Unfortunately, many states, instead of providing solutions, are
actually part of the problem.'37 This section proposes a solution to the
problem of clergy sexual exploitation and suggests that the Florida
Legislature and the legislatures of all states not having similar plans in
effect adopt this proposal. Noting that sexual exploitation by any
therapist is harmful to its victims, the proposal encompasses sexual
exploitation by secular therapists and counselors, as well as by the
clergy. 138
A. The Four-Pronged Solution
This Comment advances a solution to clergy sexual exploitation
that encompasses four elements: (1) education, (2) support services,
(3) criminal sanctions, and (4) a civil remedy.
1. Education
The first element of this proposal is education. It is evident that an
extremely large segment of society is unaware of the extent and nature
of clergy sexual exploitation.139 So deeply embedded is society's igno-
rance that even in the few states that have criminalized this form of
135. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(h)-U) (West 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West
1990).
136. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01-.06 (West 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.70 (West
1990).
137. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4508, 4980.01 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986); MIcH. Com'.
LAws § 333.18214(5) (1979); N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 31.02(a)(3)(iii) (McKinney 1978) (sta-
tutes regulating secular counselors but exempting the clergy).
138. Although the majority of courts have held that sexual relations between some forms of
secular therapists and their patients constitute malpractice, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text, some courts have been reluctant to hold that these relations are malpractice per se, see, e.g.,
Jacobsen v. Muller, 181 Ga. App. 382, 352 S.E.2d 604 (1986) (plaintiff could not recover be-
cause she was aware that sexual relations were beyond the scope of her counselor's duty and
because she responded positively to her counselor's amorous advancements). By requiring that
the plaintiff prove that her counselor had made sexual relations a part of the counseling, the
court in Jacobsen ignored the power dynamics and transference concerns that are inherent in
therapeutic relationships. The court's archaic philosophy became evident when the presiding
judge wrote that "to allow the appellant to recover... would in effect have this court endorse a
quixotic view that the virtue of women must be defended whether it exists or not." Id. at 608
(Deen, J., concurring specially). Attitudes like this create the need for the states to step in and
declare that sexual relations between therapists and their patients are always forbidden during
the course of the counseling relationship.
139. See supra notes 38-40, 76-79 and accompanying text.
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sexual exploitation, there still remains a "lingering acceptance by
some of such sexual conduct."'10
This component of the plan has twin goals: to inform the public,
clergy, and others about the dynamics, extent, and devastating nature
of sexual exploitation; and thereby to change the attitudes that lead to
blaming the victim and ignoring the problem. To accomplish these
goals, the Florida Legislature and other state legislatures should man-
date that manuals, brochures, and other informational materials on
power imbalances and sexual exploitation be developed for distribu-
tion to the public, clergy, educational institutions, and secular coun-
selors.
Education should yield several beneficial results. Initially, it is a
step toward preventing clergy sexual exploitation. Clergymen who
clearly understand that engaging in sexual relations with parishioners
can be catastrophic to the victims may be deterred from engaging in
such relations. Also, churches and parishioners would become aware
of the problem and be more apt to identify "problem" clergymen and
to take preventive or remedial steps.
An information campaign could also be successful in helping lift the
stigma often suffered by the victims of clergy exploitation when they
are blamed for the incident and shunned by their churches and com-
munities. This would have the collateral effect of helping to highlight
the problem. Further, in diminishing worry about being blamed and
shunned by their churches and communities, many victims may be
more likely to report abuse.
2. Support Services
The second element of this proposal is support. Victims of clergy
sexual exploitation are often abandoned by their churches and com-
munities or feel so betrayed that they can't seek help for their emo-
tional injuries. The victims' harm is frequently extensive, and they
need support to aid them through their ordeal.
This part of the proposal calls on the Legislature to provide infor-
mation and referral services and to facilitate advocacy, crisis interven-
tion, and other help to the victims of clergy sexual exploitation. 4'
These measures could be implemented either through existing pro-
grams or by establishing new programs.
140. Ohrtman v. Minnesota, 466 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
141. States should also provide these forms of assistance to victims of exploitation by secular
therapists or counselors as part of a comprehensive plan aimed at combating sexual exploitation.
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3. Criminal Sanctions
As evidenced by the high rate of clergy sexual abuse, current disin-
centives are woefully ineffective in deterring this behavior. The third
element of this proposal calls for the adoption of criminal laws pat-
terned after Minnesota 42 and Wisconsin 43 law. To enhance their de-
terrent effect, these laws should include imprisonment as one of the
penalties'" and may include fines and probation; mandatory counsel-
ing may also be included as a rehabilitative measure.
The serious nature of criminal penalties calls for care in their appli-
cation. The risk and severity of serious harm to sexual exploitation
victims significantly increases whenever a clergyman assumes the role
of pastoral counselor. Accordingly, criminal penalties should attach
only when the sexual contact occurs while the clergyman is involved in
a counseling relationship with the parishioner. If the clergyman has
served as the parishioner's counselor sometime in the past, criminal
penalties should be levied only if the state can establish that the pa-
rishioner had become emotionally dependent on the clergyman. 4 5
Criminal penalties should significantly deter sexual exploitation by
pastoral counselors, while also furthering justice.
In situations where the clergyman has never been the victim's coun-
selor, criminal penalties should not apply. Because many religious de-
nominations allow their religious leaders to marry, 1' 6 some
commentators argue that it may be perfectly legitimate for single pas-
tors to court and marry parishioners. 147 The application of criminal
penalties outside the pastoral counselor context would have a chilling
effect on the relationships between clergy and their parishioners and
would in some cases be unduly harsh.
4. Civil Remedy
The fourth element of this proposal is the creation of a civil cause
of action for sexual exploitation. This cause of action should provide
relief for two types of plaintiffs.' 48 First, the Legislature should pro-
142. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(h)-(j) (West 1991).
143. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22 (West 1990).
144. The amount of jail time can be determined by each state, but it should be significant
enough to deter sexual exploitation. The sentences should also vary according to the severity of
the offense.
145. The same penalties should be applied to all secular therapists and counselors.
146. See Morey, supra note 15, at 866.
147. See Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 197 (citing Lebacaz & Barton, Pastor-Parishioner
Sexuality, EXPLOR (Winter 1988)).
148. The Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes provide protection for the first category of
plaintiffs, but not for the second. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(h)-(j) (West 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.22 (West 1990).
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vide that any person who suffers injuries caused by sexual contact
with a religious counselor has a civil cause of action for the recovery
of all resulting damages. Consent on the part of the victim would not
be a defense against this claim. Under this scenario, a plaintiff would
only need to establish three elements to prove the pastor's liability: (1)
that the religious leader is or was counseling the plaintiff for some
mental, emotional, or spiritual problem; (2) that the pastor engaged in
some form of intentional sexual contact with plaintiff; and (3) that
this sexual contact damaged the plaintiff.
Second, this cause of action would provide relief for parishioners
who are sexually exploited by the clergy outside of the counseling
sphere. Although these situations are not as problematic, they are still
worrisome and damaging enough to warrant providing some form of
civil protection to the potential victims. A person who suffers physi-
cal, mental, emotional, or pecuniary injury caused by sexual contact
with her clergyman who is not rendering and has never rendered coun-
seling services for emotional, mental, or spiritual problems would
have a cause of action for resulting damages. The plaintiff would have
to establish that she was particularly vulnerable and emotionally de-
pendent on the clergyman and that the clergyman knew or should
have known of her vulnerability and dependence. Thus, in these types
of suits, consent would be an absolute defense, negated only when the
plaintiff establishes that she was emotionally dependent and, there-
fore, incapable of consent.
The churches themselves should be held liable if it is determined
that they were negligent in hiring or supervising their clergy. Many
churches already have insurance'49 to cover such suits, and this would
provide a source of funds from which the victims of clergy sexual ex-
ploitation could be compensated. Compensation is critical because the
victims of sexual exploitation often require prolonged and expensive
treatment for their injuries.5 0 It would also serve the cause of justice
that they be compensated for their suffering.
Other likely benefits of this cause of action are increased church
supervision of pastors and increased church efforts to eradicate sexual
exploitation from clergy-parishioner relationships. Not surprisingly,
soon after the Minnesota Legislature made this activity both criminal
and civilly actionable, churches set up a statewide interdenominational
149. See Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Inten-
tional Tort Analysis, 19 RUToERS L.J. 419, 419 & n. 1,421-22.
150. Note, supra note 70, at 212.
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committee to deal with clergy sexual exploitation."' Passage of similar
legislation by other states is likely to generate the same response and
to stem the tide of clergy sexual exploitation.
The civil cause of action will also shift the risks inherent in clergy-
parishioner sexual relations. By holding the clergyman civilly liable,
the risk factor changes significantly. The clergyman, the dominant
person in these relationships, would be placed in danger of being held
liable for any damages he caused by taking advantage of a vulnerable
parishioner. It would no longer be the parishioner who is solely in
danger. Under this scheme, members of the clergy could still fall in
love and marry parishioners, but now they would be assuming some
of the inherent risks and would have to refrain from exploiting vulner-
able parishioners.
B. The Issue of Constitutionality
The ideas proposed here involve the imposition of government regu-
lation on the clergy. It is therefore necessary to conduct an inquiry
into the constitutionality of this proposal.
The freedom of religion clause of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'' 52 The United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted this clause as providing the absolute free-
dom to hold and to profess religious beliefs.' 3 In doing so, the Court
has held that the government may not compel affirmation of repug-
nant beliefs,"54 punish the expression of religious doctrines it considers
fallacious,'15 exclude individuals from receiving the benefits of public
welfare legislation because of their faith or lack of it,' 56 impose special
burdens on certain individuals on the basis of their religious views,' 7
or lend its power to one side or another in controversies over religious
authority or doctrine. 58 In short, the first amendment excludes "any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such."-9
The freedom to act upon one's religious convictions, however, does
not enjoy the same level of absolute protection. 6° The Court has rea-
soned that "[t]o permit [the uncontrolled exercise of religion] would
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
151. King & Woodward, supra note 18, at 48.
152. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
153. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
154. Toraso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
155. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
156. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
157. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
158. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
159. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (emphasis in original).
160. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself."''6
Traditionally, the courts have only permitted regulation of religious
conduct that "invariably posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order." 1 62 State laws burdening religion were sub-
jected to strict scrutiny 63 and could be sustained only if shown to be
indispensable to accomplishing a compelling state interest.1
Protection under the free exercise clause does not automatically at-
tach simply because the party challenging a state regulation is a reli-
gious figure or organization. 65  In freedom of religion cases, the
threshold question is whether the defendant's conduct is religiously
motivated.'"6
Applying the foregoing analysis to the laws proposed in this Com-
ment, it becomes evident that laws imposing civil and criminal penal-
ties on sexually exploitative clergy are constitutional. Several factors
lead to this conclusion.
Initially, imposing penalties on clergy sexual abuse arguably does
not even implicate the first amendment. As the court in Strock v.
PressnelP67 stated: "[Wle find it difficult to conceive of pastoral for-
nication with a parishioner or communicant as a legitimate religious
belief or practice in any faith."' Indeed, "an asserted claim so bi-
zarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation ... [is] not ... entitled to
protection under the Free Exercise Clause."'' 69
However, the issue of religious motivation should not be based on
the court's opinion of the particular belief or practice in question. 70
"[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
161. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
162. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
163. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
164. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 691, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("Our precedents have long required the Government to show that a compelling state
interest is served by its refusal to grant a religious exemption."); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest."); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[Olnly those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
165. See, e.g., Destafano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (priest who had sexual
relations with a parishioner under his religious counsel not automatically immune from tort lia-
bility).
166. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("[T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims
must be rooted in religious belief.").
167. 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988).
168. Id. at 209 n.l, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 n.l. (1988).
169. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
170. Id. at 714.
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tion." 7 The relevant inquiry is to determine whether the religious be-
lief in question is sincerely held by the claimant. 72 Still, it is unlikely
that many claimants will argue that they have a right based on a reli-
gious belief to sexually exploit their followers, and it is even less likely
that courts will accept the veracity of this claim.
Nevertheless, contrary to the court's conclusion in Strock, it is pos-
sible to envision some fringe religious sects that might actually include
sexual relations between priests and followers as one of its religious
practices. 73 Even if it is accepted that the free exercise clause applies
in these cases, the laws proposed in this Comment would still pass
constitutional scrutiny. These proposed laws are vitally needed to ac-
complish a compelling and overriding state interest: the protection of
parishioners from the devastation caused by clergy sexual exploita-
tion. As this Comment has demonstrated, there are no less restrictive
means available to tackle this intractable problem. As such, these laws
pass the traditional standard for constitutional infringement on the
exercise of religion.
Even assuming that the proposed laws do not meet the compelling
state interest and least restrictive means test traditionally applied by
the courts, they would still be constitutional. According to the Su-
preme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 74 the proposed sexual
exploitation laws would not have to pass the traditional compelling
state interest test. 75 The Court in Smith held that as long as a law is
not specifically directed at certain religious practices or beliefs and is
otherwise applied to those who are engaged in the proscribed behavior
for nonreligious reasons, the law is constitutionally sound.176 The laws
proposed here are not specifically directed at the religious practices of
any particular denomination; instead, they are directed at persons in
power positions who take advantage of their power to prey on vulner-
able victims. The laws would apply in full vigor whether the perpetra-
tor was acting on his perceived religious beliefs or simply on a sexual
whim. The laws would also apply to psychologists, psychiatrists, and
171. Id.
172. Frazee v. Employment Sec. Dept., 489 U.S. 829, 832-33 (1989).
173. Note, Clergy Malpractice: A Constitutional Approach, 41 S.C.L. REV. 459, 467 n.55
(1990).
174. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
175. Id. The majority reasoned that if the compelling interest test is to be applied at all, then
it must be applied to all actions that were thought to be religiously motivated. The Court stated
that if the compelling interest test was strictly and faithfully applied, many laws would fail to
meet its standard. The Court argued that any society adopting the compelling interest test would
be courting anarchy and that countless worthwhile laws would have to be stricken from the
books because they did not fulfill interests of the "highest order." Id. at 1604-05.
176. Id. at 1599.
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other secular therapists and counselors. 17 Their general applicability
to all therapists should eliminate any constitutional hurdle that might
otherwise exist. 78
VI. CONCLUSION
During the last two decades, the women's movement has battled
"to bring violence against women in all of its forms out of the
closet." 79 Bringing clergy sexual exploitation into the open is a critical
element in eradicating this most reprehensible form of human behav-
ior. Only recently have sexually exploited parishioners begun to come
forward.
Now that the extent of this problem is coming to light, states must
take strong action to prevent further exploitation, to compensate the
victims, and to punish the perpetrators. Clergy sexual exploitation is a
problem that can no longer be ignored, and it is one that certainly will
not go away by itself. Adoption of the solutions proposed in this
Comment will help end this problem.
Knowledge is empowerment,' 80 and this proposal will bring that
knowledge out of the shadows. Only with knowledge can the current
attitudes, which blame the victims for the clergy's wrongdoing, be
changed. This proposal puts the blame on the perpetrators and puts
the power of the law behind the victims.
This proposal also provides incentives for churches to better police
themselves, deters potential perpetrators, and provides compensation
for the victims. Perhaps just as important, this proposal will ensure
that justice is finally served. After all, "Ii]ustice is part of the healing
process." 8'
177. See supra note 138.
178. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
179. Cooper-White, supra note 13, at 196.
180. Id.
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